This essay was written by Bob Baulch and Grace Kumchulesi.
At the end of October, the National Statistical Office (NSO) released a new set of population projections for Malawi, based on the results of the 2018 Census. A few days later, these projections were described by the Vice President as “a national tragedy”. They show Malawi’s population growth rate slowing from 2.9% in 2018 to 1.7% in 2050, but our total population growing from 17.6 million in 2018 to 33.6 million in 2050 (see bottom line in Figure 1). The NSO’s latest population projection compares to 43.2 million in 2050 according to the United Nations latest median population projections (see top line in Figure 1). What are the reasons that both organizations project a sharp increase in Malawi’s population, despite the decline in our population growth rate?
Inside the Population Projections
Mathematically, a decline in the population growth rate can come from a decline in the fertility rate, an increase in the mortality rate, or a decline in net immigration. Malawi’s total fertility rate (the average number of children expected to be born to a woman during her childbearing years) has declined from 7.6 in 1977 to 4.2 in 2018, and is expected to decline to 2.8 by 2050. Figure 2, which shows the age-specific fertility rates actually used in the NSO’s population projections, confirms that fertility is expected to decline in all reproductive age groups over time.
Meanwhile, declining mortality particularly for infants and young children (Figure 3), results in an increase in life expectancy at birth from 65.1 years in 2018 to 74.7 years in 2050. Over this period, life expectancy for females will increase by almost 10 years, while that for males increases by 9.2 years. Net migration, of 43,000 people per year is also assumed by the NSO, although this makes very little difference to the overall population growth rates that are projected.
The decline in age-specific mortality rates found in the 2018 Census are perhaps easier to explain than the decline in age-specific fertility rates. We know that since 1950 both infant and under-five mortality in Malawi have dropped rapidly (Figure 4). This may be attributed to several factors including the adoption of modern clinical medicine and mass programs to increase immunization among infants and younger children. Improvements in access to improved sources of water, which the Census shows has increased from 74% in 2008 to 85%, oral rehydration therapy (ORT) and other public health interventions will have reduced the incidence of diarrheal diseases, one of the biggest killers of infants and young children. More recently, the initiatives to encourage mothers to give births in registered clinics, and community management of acute malnutrition (C-MAM) feeding programs have also done much to reduce infant and under-five mortality in Malawi.[i]
Second, the sharp drop in age-specific fertility rates may be largely explained by higher female education, increases in modern contraceptive use, and improvements in child survival. Female education is likely to have a large impact on fertility rates, as marriage and child births get delayed when younger women stay longer in education.[ii] The mean age at first marriage for females has risen over the last few decades. In 1987, females were marrying on average, at the age of 18.4; now the typical age of marriage for females is two years higher at the age of 20.4. These averages do, however, conceal huge variations due to factors such as economic status, area of residence, and culture.
Regrettably, delayed marriages have coincided with an increase in pregnancies and motherhood from 26% in 2010 to 29% in 2015-16 among female adolescents. At the time of the 2015-16 DHS, at least 22% of young females aged 15 to 19 years had given birth, while another 7% were pregnant (NSO and ICF 2017). While the share of women aged 15 to 59 using modern contraceptive methods (59% among married and 43% among unmarried women) in the DHS 2015-16 has risen, the results of a nationwide reproductive survey conducted by the University of Malawi’s College of Medicine and the U.S. Guttmacher Institute found that a startling 53% of pregnancies in 2015 were unintended, with almost a third of pregnancies resulting in induced abortions (Polis et al. 2017). The 2015-16 DHS reports that 19% of currently married women have an unmet need for family planning. Of those females not currently using contraception, 11% wanted to space births out more, while 8% wanted to limit them. The contraceptive prevalence rate would increase from 59% to 78%, if all married women who want to space or limit their children were to use modern family planning method.
Improving child survival is another key driver of fertility decline. Malawi has registered significant decrease in childhood mortality since 1992 when the first DHS was conducted. Under-five mortality declined by 73% from 234 deaths per 1,000 live births in 1992 to 63 deaths per 1,000 live births in 2015-16. Over the same period, infant mortality declined from 135 deaths to 42 deaths per 1,000 births. However, neonatal mortality has not declined much: it dropped from 41 deaths per 1,000 live births in 1992 to 27 deaths per 1,000 births in 2004 and has not declined significantly since then (Figure 5).
The Youth Bulge: Demographic Dividend or Burden?
This brings us to the speed of Malawi’s demographic transition and the related issue of the whether the ‘youth bulge’ represents a demographic dividend or a burden to Malawi’s socio-economic development (see, inter alia, MFEPD 2016 and Karra, Canning and Wilder 2017). A recent IFPRI book found that ‘the most distinguishing feature of Sub-Saharan African’s demographic transition is that it occurred far later than in other developing regions’ (Mueller and Thurlow 2019). The authors go on to identify 2003 as the year when Sub-Saharan Africa’s countries youth population (aged 15 to 24 years old) peaked. However, the continental average disguises considerable variation between countries within Africa ─ with Mauritius’s youth peaking in 1967 but the Democratic Republic of the Congo not expected to reach its peak until 2027. Due to the youthful age structure of its population, Malawi did not reach its youth peak until 2010. In this year, Malawi’s youth (aged 15 to 24 years) comprised 41.3% of the total population.
Figure 6 shows the age and sex structure of Malawi’s population at the times of the 1987 and 2018 censuses, plus the NSO’s latest projections for 2048. The three population pyramids in this figure make it clear that Malawi’s demographic transition will have barely begun by 2048, and just how fast Malawi’s youth population (which is represented by the width of the bars of the first four pairs of horizontal bars) is growing. The UN’s population projections show that it is not until the 2080s that Malawi’s demographic transition will really begin.
This raises the question of whether—despite the hope for a demographic dividend—Malawi’s youth may not actually prove to be a burden for some years to come. This, naturally, raises the important policy question of what can be done to make our youth more educated, skilled and productive? Such changes are essential if Malawi’s youth are to contribute more to per capita GDP growth than they do to reduce it through force of their sheer numbers.
Conclusion
As will be outlined in Malawi’s National Transformation 2063 Vision, rapid population growth is one of the key challenges facing the future economic and social development of Malawi. While the decline in the population growth rate projected by the NSO in its latest projections are profoundly to be welcomed, Malawi’s population is still expected to almost double by 2050. Such rapid population growth, which is driven by the ‘momentum’[iii] of Malawi’s population, poses both opportunities (in the form of the demographic dividend from the expanding working population) and challenges (in the form of increasing numbers of dependents that must be fed and cared for). Responding appropriately to this twin opportunity and challenge is key to Malawi’s future socio-economic development, so that the benefits of the demographic dividend are maximized while those of the demographic burden are minimized. Among other policy responses, Malawi should enhance educational and skill levels by investing appropriately in primary, secondary, tertiary, and TEVET education; provide decent employment opportunities for our rapidly growing labor force; implement universal family planning programs and services; and eliminate early marriages.
About the Authors
Bob Baulch is a Senior Research Fellow of the International Food Policy Research Institute, and Leader of its Malawi Strategy Support Program.
Grace Kumchulesi is Director of Development Planning in the National Planning Commission (NPC), Government of Malawi.
Acknowledgment
The authors thank Petros Mkandawire for preparing the graphics in this extended essay.
Further reading
Karra, M., D. Canning, and J. Wilde. 2017. The Effect of Fertility Decline on Economic Growth in Africa: A Macrosimulation Model. Population and Development Review 43 (S1): 237 –263. https://doi.org/10.1111/padr.12009 (see also IFPRI Malawi event post “The Demographic Dividend in Africa: Does it Apply to Malawi?”)
MFEPD (Ministry of Finance, Economic Planning, and Development). 2016. Harnessing the Demographic Dividend to Accelerate Socio-economic Transformation and Economic Development in Malawi. Lilongwe: MFEPD, with United Nations Country Team, United Nations Fund for Population and Development, and African Institute for Development Policy.
Mueller, V. and J. Thurlow, eds. 2019. Youth and Jobs in Rural Africa: Beyond Stylized Facts. New York, NY: International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198848059.003.0001
NSO (National Statistical Office) and ICF. 2017. Malawi Demographic and Health Survey 2015–16. Zomba, Malawi, and Rockville, Maryland, USA. NSO and ICF. https://dhsprogram.com/publications/publication-fr319-dhs-final-reports.cfm
———. 2020. 2018 Population and Housing Census: Population Projections 2020–2050 Report, Zomba: National Statistical Office. http://www.nsomalawi.mw/images/stories/data_on_line/demography/census_2018/Thematic_Reports/Population%20Projections%202018-2050.pdf
NSO and MPC. 1987. “Population and Housing Census 1987 - IPUMS Subset.” National Statistical Office and Minnesota Population Center. Accessed November 8, 2020. https://international.ipums.org/international/citation.shtml
Polis, C.B., M. Chisale, P. Jesse, C. Wanangwa, E. Chipeta, and A. Msusa.2017. “Incidence of Induced Abortion in Malawi, 2015.” PLoS ONE 12(4). https://doi.org/10.1371/journal. pone.0173639
Ruel, M., and J. Hoddinott. 2008. Investing in Early Childhood Nutrition. IFPRI Policy Brief 8. https://ebrary.ifpri.org/digital/collection/p15738coll2/id/24497
United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. 2019. World Population Prospects 2019. Online Edition, Revision 1. New York: United Nations. https://population.un.org/wpp/
[i] One puzzle is, however, that infant, child and stunting rates have all dropped rapidly at the same time according to the DHS. International experience suggests that when infant mortality rates drop, stunting among children under the age of 5 usually remains high, as the sickly infants who would otherwise have died typically do not grow as fast as their healthier counterparts.
[ii] This assumes that most child births take place within marriage.
[iii] Put differently, the population of Malawi can be compared to an ocean-going tanker on a collision course with a large rock and which, due to its speed (momentum) takes quite some time to turn around.
The Nation (Malawi) published a feature article based on this essay in its weekend edition on November 28, 2020. Download the article here. (PDF 1 MB)
Featured image - photo credit: Johannes Kaltenbach/Welthungerhilfe
